{"id":441,"date":"2020-01-29T08:51:00","date_gmt":"2020-01-29T08:51:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogg.sh.se\/forvaltningsakademin\/?p=441"},"modified":"2020-01-29T10:39:51","modified_gmt":"2020-01-29T10:39:51","slug":"municipally-owned-enterprises-as-danger-zones-for-corruption-how-politicians-having-feet-in-two-camps-may-undermine-conditions-for-accountabilit-bergh-andreas-lunds-universitet-sweden-erlingsson","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogg.sh.se\/forvaltningsakademin\/artikel\/municipally-owned-enterprises-as-danger-zones-for-corruption-how-politicians-having-feet-in-two-camps-may-undermine-conditions-for-accountabilit-bergh-andreas-lunds-universitet-sweden-erlingsson\/","title":{"rendered":"Municipally Owned Enterprises as Danger Zones for Corruption?: How Politicians Having Feet in Two Camps May Undermine Conditions for Accountabilit Bergh, Andreas Lunds universitet, Sweden. Erlingsson, Gissur \u00d3 Link\u00f6pings universitet, Institutionen f\u00f6r studier av samh\u00e4llsutveckling och kultur, Centrum f\u00f6r kommunstrategiska studier \u2013 CKS. Link\u00f6pings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Gustafsson, Anders J\u00f6nk\u00f6ping Business School and The Ratio Institute, Sweden. Wittberg, Emanuel Link\u00f6pings universitet, Institutionen f\u00f6r ekonomisk och industriell utveckling, Institutet f\u00f6r analytisk sociologi, IAS. Link\u00f6pings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. 2019 (Engelska) Ing\u00e5r i: Public Integrity, ISSN 1099-9922, E-ISSN 1558-0989, Vol. 21, nr 3, s. 320-352 Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat) Published"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Abstract [en]<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p>The market-inspired reforms of New Public Management have been particularly pronounced in Swedish local government. Notably, municipally owned enterprises (MOEs) have rapidly grown in numbers. Principal-agent theory gives rise to the hypothesis that the massive introduction of MOEs has impacted negatively on the conditions for accountability in Swedish local government. To study this, social network analysis was employed in mapping networks for 223 MOEs in 11 strategically chosen municipalities, covering a total of 732 politicians. The analysis reveals substantial overlaps between principals (representatives of the ultimate stakeholders, citizens) and agents (the boards of the MOEs). Hence, corporatization of public services seems to imply worrisome entanglements between the politicians who are set to steer, govern, and oversee MOEs on the one hand, and the board members of MOEs on the other. The increasing numbers of MOEs may therefore have adverse effects on accountability in important and growing parts of Swedish local government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Ort, f\u00f6rlag, \u00e5r, upplaga, sidor<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p>Routledge, 2019. Vol. 21, nr 3, s. 320-352<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Nyckelord [en]<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p>Accountability, Corruption, Hybrid Organizations, Local Government, Moral Hazard, New Public Management, Principal-Agent Theory, Publicly Owned Enterprises, Social Networks, Transparency<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Nationell \u00e4mneskategori<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p>Studier av offentlig f\u00f6rvaltning<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Identifikatorer<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p>URN:&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/urn.kb.se\/resolve?urn=urn%3Anbn%3Ase%3Aliu%3Adiva-153734\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-153734<\/a>DOI:&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/10999922.2018.1522182\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">10.1080\/10999922.2018.1522182<\/a>ISI:&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/apps.webofknowledge.com\/InboundService.do?product=WOS&amp;action=retrieve&amp;mode=FullRecord&amp;UT=000474665000007\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">000474665000007<\/a>OAI: oai:DiVA.org:liu-153734DiVA, id:&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.diva-portal.org\/smash\/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A1275955\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">diva2:1275955<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Forskningsfinansi\u00e4r<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p>Vetenskapsr\u00e5det<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Abstract [en] The market-inspired reforms of New Public Management have been particularly pronounced in Swedish local government. Notably, municipally owned enterprises (MOEs) have rapidly grown in numbers. Principal-agent theory gives rise to the hypothesis that the massive introduction of MOEs has impacted negatively on the conditions for accountability in Swedish local government. To study this, [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[6],"tags":[26,19,36],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogg.sh.se\/forvaltningsakademin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/441"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogg.sh.se\/forvaltningsakademin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogg.sh.se\/forvaltningsakademin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogg.sh.se\/forvaltningsakademin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/14"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogg.sh.se\/forvaltningsakademin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=441"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/blogg.sh.se\/forvaltningsakademin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/441\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":442,"href":"https:\/\/blogg.sh.se\/forvaltningsakademin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/441\/revisions\/442"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogg.sh.se\/forvaltningsakademin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=441"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogg.sh.se\/forvaltningsakademin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=441"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogg.sh.se\/forvaltningsakademin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=441"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}