

Influencing politics, politicians and bureaucrats: Explaining differences between Swedish CSOs' strategies to promote political and social change

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This paper aims at analyzing the ways in which Swedish civil society organizations (CSO) make use of different strategies for the purpose of influencing society and politics, on the local, national and European level.

Civil dialogue models and partnerships between different sets of actors are becoming more frequent as forms for political participation not only at the national level but also at the EU-level and at the local level. This trend has also been described as a shift from government to governance i.e. from hierarchical methods based on compulsory rules and state-centred corporatism to network-based methods of voluntary participation in society-centred partnerships (Mörth & Sahlin-Andersson 2006). When it comes to the citizenry, researchers focusing on political participation and social movements has on the other hand claimed that while citizens in Western democracies are abandoning the political parties and express lower trust in political institutions, they at the same time increasingly engage in more direct forms for affecting politics, such as participating in demonstrations and signing petitions (Norris 2002).

The relationship between the state and civil society organizations (CSO) in Sweden has often been described in previous research as framed by centralized state governance structure based on a strong corporatist tradition. Such an image of the Swedish model has recently partly been challenged by a view that also emphasize the participative and deliberative character of Swedish democracy, as a model "in which the free associations – not least the unions, the cooperative movement, and the employers' organizations – co-govern Swedish society in close but free cooperation with the representatives of state" (Trägårdh 2007: 2).

The concept of corporatism (Rothstein 1992; Lewin 1992; Schmitter 1974) is controversial and has many different definitions, but can generally be described as organized interests involved in public decision-making in close and institutionalized forms (such as membership in public agencies' boards or participation in governmental commission processes). Corporatist arrangements imply that some organizations are given a special status as the state institutionalizes its contact with them and elevates them to legitimate participants in public decision-making. Often, it is highlighted that these selected organizations have and/or get a harmonious and close relationship to the state (Pierre & Rothstein, 2003; Lindvall & Sebring 2005). The types of organizations that are part of a corporatist arrangement are hierarchical, centralized, and enjoy almost a monopoly on representing their members (Naurin 2001).

Discussions on corporate structures and arrangements have waned in recent years and it is certainly because the Swedish political system step by step has moved away from corporatism (Hermansson et al. 1999). In the early 1990s, the employers' organizations left the centralized negotiations with the national government and trade unions. After a few years the government also chose to change the composition of many boards and agencies, by excluding organizations that were earlier included. Researchers suggest that those organizations that had previously a privileged position in the corporatist political system sought other avenues for reaching influence on policy, for example through advocacy and/or lobbying. It indicates that there has been a transformation of governance in a direction where the voices become more numerous, competition for the politicians' attention increases, and that personal contacts and networks become more important at the expense of the traditional corporatist arranged consultation forms (Hermansson et al. 1999: 50). This would suggest that the relationship between government and CSOs adopted more pluralistic forms in terms of less institutionalized cooperation, and that individual organizations are less embedded in the public structures and seeking influence through a variety of channels.

Previous studies of CSOs' use of corporative structures or lobbying strategies have mainly focused on interest groups and organizations. Research about social movements has been however interested in CSOs' use of more contentious forms of strategies, such as street protests. An important distinction between social movements and other forms of organized collective action (e.g. interest groups) is that social movements are defined by their use of non-institutionalized means of action (Snow et al 2004). The present study focuses on both types of strategies (institutionalized and non) and includes four types of CSOs belonging to different types of movements, each with its own history and characteristics: trade unions, temperance organizations, disability organizations and women's organizations.

The CSOs' choice of strategies to accomplish social and political change also depends on which specific policy fields they are active. Furthermore, most policy fields are regulated at different administrative levels, which make it more relevant for some CSOs to address certain levels rather than others. In the case of the Swedish CSOs it might be important to have access to and gain influence at several administrative levels, from the local municipality to the EU level.

Aim, research questions and empirical data

This paper aims at analyzing the ways in which Swedish CSOs make use of different strategies for the purpose of influencing society and politics. Three different strategies are focused on: *advocacy*, *lobbying* and *street protests*. The analysis includes different types of CSOs working with different issues and within different policy areas. We will focus on CSOs belonging to four different Swedish social movements: the worker's movement, the temperance movement, the disability movement and the women's rights movement. The following research questions will be answered:

1. In which degree do these four types of Swedish CSOs use different strategies to influence politics and society?
2. Which factors best explains these CSOs use different (or similar) strategies, both regarding the characteristics of the political context and the CSOs' own resources?

To answer the second question we will analyze the impact of factors such as organizational type, policy area of activity, the organizations' economic resources, their assessment of the most important administrative level for influence (local, national, or European), as well as their perceived effectiveness of working at different levels etc.

The paper builds on unique empirical data from a recently conducted survey based on a random sample of 6,180 Swedish CSOs made from a total population of 80,000 Swedish CSOs, with a survey response rate of 51.3%.¹ The CSOs sampled in the survey include organizations working with social welfare, social care, advocacy, interest representation and religious congregations.

¹ The survey was made as part of the research project "Beyond the Welfare State: The Europeanization of Swedish Civil Society Organizations", which is financed by The Swedish Research Council (2011–2015).

Theoretical framework

The paper draws on the extensive literature on “political opportunity structures” (POS), “resource mobilization” and “multi-level governance”, which provides a basis for theorizing about different institutional explanations (e.g. the degree of institutional access at national level) and organizational explanations (e.g. organizational resources). The theoretical contributions to the understanding and explaining of strategic collective action in political groups have been many, focusing on different factors. Among these factors we find both the political and socio-economic environment in which the collective actors are embedded and the characteristics of the organizations (Casey 2004). The first factor, or set of factors, has been mostly highlighted by the theories that go under the general theoretical framework called the “political opportunity structure approach”. The second set of factors has been often focused within the “resource mobilization approach”, which has also been developed by social movement scholars. Despite differences in focus, scholars have often emphasized the necessity of combining and integrating the two perspectives (McAdam et al. 1996).

The political opportunity structure approach rests on the idea that “social movements and revolutions are shaped by the broader set of political constraints and opportunities unique to the national context in which they are embedded” (McAdam et al. 1996: 3). The resource mobilization approach tends to focus on mobilization processes and the formal organizational manifestations of these processes, “social movement organizations” (SMOs, which we in this paper will talk about as CSOs) (McCarthy & Zald 1977). The split between these two traditions reflects in a sense the split between structure and actor. Both the political opportunity structure and the resource mobilization approach in fact highlight the importance of the context for explaining the mobilization of different groups and the development of processes of self-organization, but the resource mobilization theory shifts the focus from the structures to the collective actors that interact with them.

The political opportunity structure perspective relies on the idea that societal structural elements might contain political opportunities for collective action and mobilization, and affect “the *strategy*, organizational *structure* and ultimate *success* of social movements” (Campbell 2005: 45). Arguably, changes in the structural and environmental conditions in which social movements – or other similar actors – operate, will have an effect on what these types of actors are doing, how they are doing things, with what ambitions and with what possible result. Second, we can also find some major consensus that POS ought to be pictured as multi-dimensional, as these create an opportunity structure that can both “... constrain actors from pursuing some courses of action and enable them to pursue others” (Campbell 2005:45). Third, equally important is the argument that changes might occur in the political system, yet without resulting in any kind of collective action. McAdam et al. (1996:8) argued that no matter how momentous a change in the political system is, “... it only becomes an ‘opportunity’ when

defined as such by a group of actors sufficiently well organized to act on this shared definition of the situation”.

Cross-national comparative research shows that the Swedish welfare state regime is characterized by close, structured hierarchical relationships between the public and private sectors and that the “third sector” (i.e. civil society) is characterized by strong, centralized organizations which are organized according to service areas interacting with a strong state that seeks consensus on policies through corporatist arrangements (Casey 2004). There are however important differences in political opportunity structures also within single countries, for instance between policy fields. Some policy fields might be regulated more at municipal level – which in Sweden is the case for example social care and primary education – while others – like Swedish health care – is more regulated at the regional level.

When it comes to different CSOs’ resources, it is also important to make a distinction between producer- and client-oriented organizations. This is a difference that may affect the choice of strategies of the CSOs working for changes of social policies: “[P]roducer interests, such as labor unions, organize members based on their function in the economy, which implies that the strike threat becomes an important power resource. Of course, client organizations cannot use a similar threat, which leads many to conclude that their power relation with the state is asymmetrical” (Feltenius 2004: 141). According to this logic the state can ignore client interests to a higher degree than producer interests. A few Swedish studies have however shown that disabled, pensioners and migrant organizations have been able to establish long-term relationships and exert some – albeit limited – influence on national policies in their fields of interest (Markström 2003; Feltenius 2004; Aytar 2007). During the past decade there has been a growth of consultations and contacts between the governmental ministries and CSOs’ representatives in the welfare sector, especially involving the non-profit organizations that represent different “user groups” or “consumer groups” (of welfare services) (Johansson et al. 2011).

The argument above about client interests versus producer interests shows the importance of considering not only the political opportunity structures available but also the CSOs’ capacity to use them. John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1977) launched the resource mobilization theory as a contribution to the social movement research. However, the resource mobilization theory does not focus so much on the movement in itself, but rather on social movement organizations (SMOs, or CSOs). Such organizations identify their “goals with the preferences of a social movement or a counter-movement and attempts to implement those goals” (McCarthy & Zald 1977: 1218). The function of the organizations is thus to contribute to the implementation of such goals.

The achievement of the aims and goals require that social movement organizations can have access to resources. Such resources are in the hands of individuals and other organizations, and can include legitimacy, money, properties and labor. The resources they can provide are also relevant for the social movement organization when deciding which strategies to adopt in relation to its environment (McCarthy & Zald 1977).

Resources are however only one of the possible characteristics of CSOs that might impact on their strategies. Casey (2004) mentions three other sets of factors. First, the ideology and culture of the CSOs – and especially whereas they are more or less “political” – may influence their choice between moderate or contentious strategies. Secondly, the size of membership might also be relevant, as organizations that can mobilize more people may have more possibilities to make their voices heard. Thirdly, CSOs that are considered as “insiders” by the political system might have a larger repertoire of strategies at their disposition than “outsiders”, since the latter lacks access to more formal channels for influencing public policy.

A multi-level system of interest representation

The fact that most CSOs tries to influence politics on different geographical levels makes the picture even more complex. The European Union is often taken as a clear example of how supranational forms of governance today is making it harder for CSOs to address their claims and critique at the most adequate level, since the EU have been given greater competences to decide over policy areas that formerly were decided only within nation states. However, the allocation of policymaking and implementation to different geographical levels is nothing radically new. In most nation-states, local and regional political and administrative bodies have considerable power over how many regulations decided at the national level is implemented locally and regionally. As discussed above, the sub-national levels can even be said to be of greater importance than the nation-state level for some policy areas. This multi-layered structure of political decision-making and policy implementation confronts the CSOs with different types of political opportunities at different geographical levels. As a consequence, the CSOs have to consider whether different levels are more or less efficient to influence if they want to accomplish their political goals. Furthermore, certain types of strategies may for different reasons be more efficient at some geographical levels than others; and some strategies may work in some policy areas but not in others.

In an analysis of why the organizations of the environmental movement do not use street protests to influence EU policies but instead tends to use lobbying while for instance farmers’ organizations use both types of strategies, Rucht (2001) identify some factors – both in the “political opportunity structure” and in the CSOs themselves – that may contribute to these strategic choices. Even though Rucht primarily discuss the nation-state vis-à-vis the EU level and environmental policies (and the

CSOs making claims in this policy area), his way of reasoning could surely be applied to other levels of decision-making and policy areas.

As a first factor, Rucht (2001: 135) highlights the relative impact on a specific policy area a certain level of decision-making has in relation to other geographical levels. In the case of environmental policies, the regulatory capacity of the EU may have increase during later years, but compared to agricultural policies (which is both subjected to firm regulation on the EU level and makes up the single largest part in the EU budget) the influence of the EU vis-à-vis the nation-states is still quite weak. Therefore, it will be more adequate for CSOs to influence national or sub-national politicians and officials, in order to accomplish political change. In connection to this, Rucht identifies a second factor, which also relate to the decision-making procedures of the EU. While decisions made in some policy areas in the EU only need majority decisions, others need to be decided unanimously. In the case of the latter – especially when one’s own government is more favorable to proposed EU policies than the governments of other member states – it would be more efficient to first influence national policy-makers, in order to later have a more powerful ally when decisions are to be taken (or blocked by veto) at the EU level. One could probably find these dynamics at play also between the nation-state and the local or regional levels of political decision-making and policy implementation.

As a third factor, Rucht (2001: 136), claims that certain forms of strategies can be seen as more “adequate” on certain levels of decision-making than others. In his analysis of environmental CSOs, he points out that lobbying de facto is more common and widely accepted by policy-makers on the EU level than for instance street protests are, compared with how street protests are relatively more common on the nation-state and sub-national levels. This can, according to Rucht, depend on the availability for access and resources for lobbyists in the EU structure, and thus institutional aspects, but also on the “culture” that dominates both amongst EU policy-makers and CSO lobbyists, which seems to favor the use of lobbying over street protests. But also this differs between CSOs that are trying to influence different policy areas. As Rucht points out, farmers have staged both Brussels-based and transnationally coordinated street protests held simultaneously in different EU countries, while environmentalist CSOs very seldom have done this. This argument shows that CSOs working with different types of issues have developed different types of relations to the policy-makers and officials they try to influence. If they have established and good access to decision-makers, they may not want to adventure these lobbying channels by using more confrontational strategies as street protests. Going beyond Rucht’s discussion, one could further assume that such preferred choices of strategies also fall back on more “cultural” factors – in the sense specific actors’ more established values and patterns of behavior – depending on the dominant “protest culture” (Johnston 2009) of a country, or more or less variation between the “social movement cultures” (McDonald 2006) that characterizes different sectors of CSOs. Furthermore, Rucht (2001: 183 f.) also points to the fact that

the EU level still lacks the type of public where political controversies are made available for a mass audience, in particular through the mass media, something that still predominantly is done on the national level. One of the prime purposes with street protests is to get the attention of the public, in order to publicly pressure politicians and officials, and this is still something that can mainly be achieved in the mass media, whose structures still foremost depend on divisions between nations and languages.

Finally, Rucht also discusses factors that concern the CSOs' resources, something that may shape their decisions on which strategies to use in order to influence policies on different levels. For instance, the CSOs may lack resources on the EU level while having good access to them on the nation-state or sub-national levels; or their organizational structure could be stronger and more united on the national level, while at the EU level being weaker and more scattered.

These considerations all show that a row of different factors may contribute to which strategies CSOs chose, when they want to influence the politicians and officials that decide over and implement the policies they see as most crucial for obtaining their goals, or for defending the interests of their members and/or constituencies. In this paper, we will scrutinize the effects of some of these factors, when analyzing whether – and if this is the case, in which sense – four “sectors” of Swedish CSOs are choosing different strategies for influencing political decision-making, and whether these strategies are employed differently on different geographical levels.

Methods and operationalization

Sampling

The sample for the survey was made amongst six categories of CSOs, based on the categories of the register data from Statistics Sweden (SCB) that was used to get in contact with the associations. Firstly, our sample contained three types of CSOs within different sectors, and secondly, each of the three sectors was divided in two groups according to their level of economic activity.

The aim with the sample was to include the Swedish CSO sectors in which one could expect to find most organizations engaged in social issues and interest representation. In line with this aim, we included two types of associations: non-profit organizations (*ideella föreningar*) and religious congregations (*registrerade trossamfund*). Most associational categories are to some extent given specific (economic and/or other) benefits in Swedish legislation, and in order to have access to these most CSOs register themselves at the authorities as belonging to one of these categories. *Non-profit organization* is the most common associational form, and it provides a legally simplified framework

for the organization to for instance make limited economic transactions without reporting his to the tax office. *Religious congregation* is a quite new associational form that was created when the Church of Sweden in 2000 lost its role as state church, which now includes the associations of the Church of Sweden as well as other churches and organizations with a church-like religious purpose (which formerly was registered as non-profit organizations). The religious congregations can, if they follow certain standards, obtain the right to have their members paying a fee through their ordinary taxation. Through this design of the sample, we thus excluded some types of associations that *may* contain a few CSOs engaged in social issues and interest representation, but due to our prior knowledge about how Swedish civil society is organized we believed these to be very few.²

As a second step, we decided to only include in the sample the non-profit organizations that were categorized by Statistics Sweden as primarily involved in the types of activities that corresponded to our research interests.³ This led to a tripartite division of our sample, between religious congregations and two types of non-profit organizations: “social service and care” and “interest representation”.⁴ Amongst the “social service and care” non-profit organizations, one can for instance find the Red Cross, Save the Children, AA, and women’s shelter, crime victim advocacy, and disability organizations. Amongst the “interest representation” non-profit organization, one for instance finds trade unions, professional and employers’ organizations, political parties, immigrants’ and pensioners’ organizations, cultural associations and freemasonry lodges. The selection of these two types of non-profit organizations thus excluded some other types of non-profit organizations, for instance sports associations. Through these choices motivated by our research interests our total population of CSOs became 80,015 associations, which can be said to represent approximately 40% of Swedish organized civil society.⁵ Amongst these registered associations one can find local or regional chapters of national

² The associational forms that were excluded were stock companies [*aktiebolag*], economic associations [*ekonomiska föreningar*], rental cooperatives [*bostadsrättsföreningar* and *hyreskooperativ*], joint property units [*samfällighetsföreningar*], foundations [*stiftelser*], friendly/benefit societies [*understödsföreningar*], public corporations [*offentliga korporationer*] and unemployment funds [*arbetslöshetskassor*].

³ Statistics Sweden categorizes all registered associations according to what they believe to be the main activity of a specific association. Even though this classification at most times can be considered to be accurate for our purposes, it happens that Statistics Sweden sometimes categorizes specific economic activities (for instance, if the main economic activity of a non-profit organization is providing a service, it may be categorized according to this activity even if the purpose of the organization is to represent a specific group).

⁴ The category “social service and care” consists of Statistics Sweden’s so-called SNI codes 86, 87 and 88, and “interest representation” consist of the SNI code 94. SNI stands for Swedish Standard Industrial Classification and is based on the standard recommended by the EU, NACE Rev.2.

⁵ The figure of 40% is based on the approximately 120,000 registered associations that were not included because they belonged to less relevant types of associations or were non-profit organizations involved in activities outside of our research interests. However, this figure only concerns the groups within civil society that has been registered at the authorities. According to the estimates in Lundström & Wijkström (1997: 272), around 58,000 unregistered groups and associations do also exist in Sweden.

federations as well as the national federations themselves; most Swedish CSOs are registering their local bodies as separate associational entities.⁶

When doing our sample from this population of 80,015 CSOs, we furthermore choose to include both organizations/congregations that were classified by Statistics Sweden as economically “active” and the ones classified as “non-active”. Since this classification is made on the basis on an organization’s/congregation’s recent contacts with the Swedish Tax Agency – and not in terms of its other on-going activities – we believed it to be more relevant for our purposes to include both “active” and “non-active” CSOs, in order to be able to later in the analysis exclude the organizations/congregations that was totally inactive.⁷ As we will see later, the differences between the associations labeled “active” by Statistics Sweden and the ones labeled “non-active” were quite small in terms of actual activities (and regarding response rate).

Since the six groups of our population were quite different in size, we decided to make a stratified sample, in order to not end up with insufficient amounts of cases for some of the smaller categories. Due to the stratified sampling procedure, the data presented in the paper is analyzed using different weights to these six groups of our sample. Table 1 shows the sizes of the samples for each of the six categories, and how these samples correspond percentagewise with the actual populations of each category.

Table 1. The sample of the survey and response rates for all covered categories of associations.

	Social service and care	Interest representation	Religious congregations	Total (N)
<i>Sample and relation to population</i>				
“Active” CSOs within sample (N)	878	1,765	516	3,159
Percentage of “active” population	100%	12%	50%	3,159
“Non-active” CSOs within sample (N)	910	1,812	299	3,021
Percentage of “non-active” population	50%	3%	25%	3,021
Total (N)	1,788	3,577	815	6,180
<i>Response rate</i>				
“Active” CSOs	58%	54%	49%	54%
“Non-active” CSOs	52%	47%	42%	48%
Total (%)	55%	51%	46%	51%
Total (N)	852	1,567	372	2,791

⁶ However, this is not always the case, since a few CSOs have decided to only register their national federation as an association in the public registers, while their local and regional chapters are treated as parts of the same association.

⁷ To be “active”, an organization have to meet *at least one* of the following criteria (according to data from the Swedish Tax Agency): have had employed staff, have paid wages, have sent other information to the Swedish Tax Agency, have had incomes, or have had assets of a higher value than 10 million SEK [approximately one million euro] and/or income from interest higher than 0.5 million SEK.

The survey questionnaire (which contained 36 main questions on nine pages) was sent by mail with a pre-paid return envelope to the contact persons or office addresses of the associations included in our sample. After three reminders and a short non-response survey by mail, 2,791 questionnaires were returned.⁸ Because of faulty postal addresses, and that some organizations had ceased to exist or changed their associational form, these CSOs were excluded from the sample (since they did not any longer belong to our population),⁹ and the final response rate was 51.3%. In Table 1, the different response rates of the six categories are shown. As can be noticed, the differences in response rates between “active” and “non-active” CSOs are quite small, as are the differences in response rates between the three types of CSOs.

Operationalization

Since we were only interested in associations that have had some kind of activities during the last year, we included a question in the questionnaire about whether the organization/congregation have had any activities during 2012. This question also enabled us to test whether the “active”/“non-active” category of Statistics Sweden had any validity for our purposes. Table 2 shows the percentage of CSOs that had any activities during 2012. This data clearly shows that Statistics Sweden’s category has quite little to do with the type of activities we are interested in here, since only very few of the “non-active” CSOs did not have any activities at all during the last year.

Table 2. The level of activity of the surveyed CSOs, divided between “active” and “non-active”.

	“Active” CSOs	“Non-active” CSOs	Total	Total (N)
<i>Had activities in 2012 (%)</i>				
Yes	97	90	94	2 593
Yes, but only occasionally	2	5	3	84
No	1	5	5	76
<i>No. of paid staff (mean value)</i>				
	23,1	1,3	14,2	2 757

In Table 2, one can also see whether the amount of paid staff differs between “active” and “non-active” associations. For this figure (shown as a mean value), the division “active”/“non-active” seems more accurate, and tells us that this division probably more serves as a measure of the economic strength and size of the association than a measure of it being active at all.

⁸ The survey was sent out in late November 2012, followed by two reminder postcards, one reminder survey and one short non-response survey in the period until late February 2013. In the non-response survey, it was possible to give reasons why the questionnaire hadn’t been answered.

⁹ The information about this group of non-respondents was drawn from returned non-delivered surveys and the returned answers of the non-response survey.

In line with our focus on associations being active at the moment, we will therefore in the data analysis below only include the cases from the organizations/congregations that have had any activities during the last year.

The categorization of CSOs

The CSOs in our database have been categorized according to a typology used by Statistics Sweden in previous studies about associational life in Sweden (Vogel et al 2003). The organizations have been classified by assessing the main focus of activity on basis of the organization's name and information that has been found on the internet (mostly the organizations' own websites). The typology used includes five types of organizations: political associations, interest associations, solidarity associations, religious associations and lifestyle associations. To these five, we added a sixth type which includes social service associations (cf. the Swedish version of the ICNPO¹⁰ typology in Lundström & Wijkström 1997). All six types are furthermore divided into a set of subcategories. The organizations from the CSO sectors chosen for this study are all taken from the subcategories of "interest associations", which mean that they primarily focus the interests of a particular group in the general population: workers/employees, women, disabled, and alcohol abusers/teetotalers.

Policy and CSO Context

The CSO sectors we will analyze all represents a specific group – and in different degrees a claimed more general interest – and their goals and interests in influencing public policy are primarily related to different social policy areas. The CSO sectors (and social policy areas) in question are trade unions (employment policies and labor market regulation), organizations of the temperance movement (alcohol policies, information and mutual help), organizations for different forms of disability (anti-discrimination and rights for the disabled) and women's organizations (anti-discrimination, gender equality and violence against women).

The CSOs analyzed in this paper belongs to movements that emerged and were formed during different historical periods and social circumstances. Both the trade unions and the temperance organizations can be seen as two instances of the prime social movements of the late 19th and early 20th century – in Sweden often called *folkrörelser* ("folk/popular movements"). During the early modernization of Sweden, it was the workers' movement (in particular the Social Democratic Party and the closely affiliated blue collar workers trade union confederation LO), the temperance movement, and the Free Church movement (i.e. nonconformist Lutheran churches that were in opposition to the Lutheran State Church of Sweden) that mobilized significant parts of the population,

¹⁰ International Classification of Nonprofit Organizations

in particular from social strata that had small resources and opportunities (see for instance Ambjörnsson 1988: 235 ff.; Micheletti 1991). Both the workers' movement and the temperance movement came to exert a decisive influence over Swedish politics and the social policies of the country during the 20th century. The other two types of CSOs analyzed in the paper did mainly emerge during another period and under other social and political circumstances. The contemporary women's movement emerged primarily from the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, while the disability movement emerged during the same period but mostly disconnected from the radical mobilizations of the 1960s.

In the following section we will shortly describe these four CSO sectors in Sweden, regarding their role in Swedish civil society and their access to policymaking, both historically and today.

Trade unions in Sweden

Still having one of the world's highest degrees of membership amongst the employed population – in 2008, more than 70 percent (Kjellberg 2009: 267)¹¹ – Swedish trade unions have for long been a central actor for representing workers and employees, and influenced much of social and economic policies in Sweden. Already in the 1930s the trade unions became one of the prime constituent parts (together with the employers' organizations and the state) of the Swedish corporatist model for regulating labor market affairs, a "social partnership" that have ensured industrial peace for long periods (Hyman 2001: 46–7).

Partly, the trade unions' high degree of political embeddedness in the Swedish regulation of social affairs have been due to the close political linkage between the largest trade union confederation (organizing blue collar workers), the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO, *Landsorganisationen*), and the Social Democratic party, which since 1932 has only been out of government office for 16 years (and this only during the last 37 years). However, also the trade union confederations for employees and professionals – the Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO, *Tjänstemännens centralorganisation*) and the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO, *Sveriges akademikers centralorganisation*) have enjoyed considerable access to both politicians and officials (without being connected to a specific political party). Despite the more or less outspoken aims to weaken the role of the trade unions that have characterized later years' liberal-conservative governments, the trade unions continues to have a high degree of political access when major decisions on social and labor market issues are to be taken by the state.

¹¹ In numbers, this would equal around 2.9 million inhabitants in Sweden (out of totally around 9 million inhabitants). Figure from 2000 (Vogel et. al. 2003: 147).

Even though the Swedish social and political model have oftentimes been labeled corporatist, many areas of labor market regulation are decided directly by the main parties of the labor market – the trade unions and the employers’ organizations – without the intervention of the state. This autonomy of the parties of the labor market has weakened slightly since the 1970s and made issues that was formerly agreed upon between the unions and employers an object for state legislation, but still many agreements are made directly between unions and employers. This relative non-interventionist role of the state has been seen as one of the reasons why Swedish unions very rarely use more contentious political strategies such as street protests (e.g. Peterson, Wahlström & Wennerhag 2012).

Demonstrations are primarily directed at elected governments and aiming to create a public pressure to make politicians to hinder, change or implement certain policies – and if disagreements about wages or other parts of the labor market regulation is handled by the unions and the employers without the state intervening, there is no use of putting pressure on the government. In this sense, the Swedish trade unions may lack the types of trade union mass demonstrations characteristic for other Western European countries; but in comparison to other European countries, the annual May Day marches in Sweden stands out and still plays an important role for the (blue collar) trade unions for mobilizing members and putting forward political claims and critique (Peterson et al. 2012).

Since 1995, when Sweden became a member of the EU, the impact of the new level of political decision-making has increased. However, apart from inner-market related policy changes, these changes have not (yet) profoundly affected the basic functioning of the Swedish labor market model. Furthermore, when it comes to being part of transnational trade union campaigns and actions on the European level, Swedish trade unions (together with the Norwegian and Danish) seems more reluctant in taking part in these compared to the unions of other Western European countries (Larsson 2013). But still, all the Swedish three main trade union confederations are members of the European Trade Union Confederation, ETUC, which also the former LO president was president for between 2007 and 2011. To influence EU policies, the Swedish trade unions have mostly been using Brussels-based lobbying and contacts with the national government, in the defense of both the Swedish “social partnership” and the interests of workers and employees in general.

Temperance organizations in Sweden

During the 20th century, the temperance movement played a pivotal role for shaping the social policies that regulated alcohol consumption in Sweden. Still today, some of these regulations are in use – in particular the state monopoly for selling alcoholic beverages in specific shops. In comparison with the trade unions, this privileged political role of the temperance movement was not due to linkages to a specific political party; rather it developed connections to most of the Swedish political parties. For periods during the 20th century, a majority of the Swedish MPs was organized in the organizations of the temperance movement and practicing teetotalers (e.g. Edman 2004: 20). In terms

of memberships, the organizations of the movement has since its peak in 1910 – of 350,000 members – been in decline (Ambjörnsson 1988: 235), but still in the year 2000, these organizations counted 80,000 members, or 1.1% of the adult population (Vogel et. al. 2003: 267).

When it comes to the organizations of the Swedish temperance movement, the first organization was created in 1879 as a Swedish branch of IOGT, the International Organization of Good Templars (which was created in the 1850s in the US), and during the following years similar temperance organizations were created as breakouts of IOGT. The organizations emanating out of the “Good Templar” tradition were to constitute the main part of the temperance movement in Sweden, and today it is still its largest organization. Since 1970 it is named IOGT-NTO due to a merge with organizations that had earlier left IOGT. Other Swedish temperance organizations established during the movement’s first period are Swedish Abstaining Motorists’ Association (MHF, *Motorförarnas Helnykterhetsförbund*) and *Sveriges Blåbandsförbund* (SBF), the Swedish branch of The International Federation of the Blue Cross. Many of the members of the organizations of the early temperance movement did also belong to the two other main social movements of the time, the workers’ movement and the Free Church movement. As noted above, this also led to connections within the political parties having their base in these movements, in particular the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Party. Another set of temperance organizations called *Länkrörelsen* (“the link movement”) was established in 1945 in Sweden, inspired by the American organization Alcoholics Anonymous (AA).

When it comes to how the temperance movement of today tries to influence Swedish politics, this is mainly done through the institutionalized channels through which it earlier worked. But if it was once a majority of the Swedish MPs that were practicing teetotalers, today it is only five percent.¹² And even if Swedish politics is still characterized by a consensus that alcohol consumption needs to be restricted to improve the health of the citizens, anti-alcohol policies have over time lost its saliency as a central political issue in Sweden. Most public discussions have been focusing how Sweden’s membership in the EU since 1995 affects the possibilities to maintain restrictive alcohol policies, i.e. to maintain exceptions from the rules of the inner market such as the state managed system of selling alcoholic beverages. For the organizations of the temperance movement, this has made EU policies an important target in their lobbying, mainly through the Swedish politicians involved in EU politics, but also through European CSO networks. For instance, both IOGT-NTO and MHF are members of the European anti-alcohol network Eurocare (The European Alcohol Policy Alliance).

¹² <http://www.dagen.se/nyheter/fa-nykterister-bland-riksdagsledamoterna/>

Disability organizations

In the early 1900s, local associations started that gathered groups with various forms of disability, but it was first in the 1940s that the various disability associations merged and formed a national confederation that became known as “The Cooperation Committee for partially working-able”, today called “The Swedish Disability Federation” (HSO, *Handikappförbundens samarbetsorgan*). The Cooperation Committee was created as a platform for contact between the various disability organizations and to promote the interest of the partially working-able. As other umbrella organizations it aimed at putting pressure on government agencies and represent disability organizations in commission processes and in the overall national debate. But the committee never got any significant influence over national policy. Nor was it able to establish any closer partnerships with the worker’s movement (Lindkvist 1992; Johansson et al. 2011).

In the 1960s, a rapid expansion occurred in the number of disability organizations. Groups of people with disabilities began questioning society’s views and definitions of disability and not least the treatment of people with disabilities. What distinguished the 1960s expansion is the contemporary emergence of users’ organizations characterized by a strong social criticism (e.g. Adamson et al 2004; Nestius 1977). During the 1970s and 1980s, the expansion of disability organizations was mostly linked to various forms of disease definitions (such as sleeping sickness or Huntington-disease), but also organizations for relatives of people with dementia or schizophrenia. These developments has contributed to the disability movement being made up of a large number of organizations often emphasizing the differences rather than commonalities between organizations; as a movement it has been characterized by internal tension and competition between organizations (Hugemark & Roman 2007; Johansson et al. 2011).

The first steps towards more institutionalized forms of consultation between disability organizations and the government was taken in the mid-1990s when the government chose to add a group of undersecretaries of the state responsible for the preparation and coordination of disability issues, which in 2001 was transformed into a formal disability delegation as a central arena for meetings between government and disability organizations (Johansson et al. 2011). In the late 1990s also a shift of perspective in the Swedish disability policy was implemented. Instead of focusing on people’s qualities and abilities the ambition was to identify the community’s ability/inability to remove barriers to participation in society. The aim was thus to incorporate a disability perspective in all sectors of society. For government agencies and authorities, this meant a new assignment. All would now work with accessibility issues in their respective areas. Today, most public agencies have a disability-forum or council at national, regional and at local level (Johansson et al 2011).

In the year 2000, 315,000 people were members of an organization for disabled persons or their relatives, which equals 4.6 percent of the adult population (age 16–84) (Vogel et al. 2001). The Swedish Disability Federation (HSO) is still the most central player in its capacity as a national umbrella organization and gathers 39 national associations. Member organizations are independent and represent their own members in a variety of contexts, but together they form a vital political player in the interest-politics on the national level. As the umbrella organization gathering the larger collective of disability organizations, HSO represents them in national delegations, councils and committees (Johansson et al. 2011).

The Europeanization of the disability policy sphere started in the 1990s with the development of the social dimension of European integration (to complement its economic dimension), not least with strong influence from the United Nations and the World Health Organization. On the EU level the European Disability Forum (EDF) gathers the majority of national organizations in the area of disability, which also includes for HSO from Sweden. This federation aims at representing and defending within the EU institutions the different interests of people with disabilities from different member states. But, nevertheless, research shows that the EDF has been able to influence EU decision-makers and to make significant advances for the benefit of persons with disabilities, regardless of the type of disability (Mohanu 2008).

Women's organizations

The women's movement in Sweden is often divided in two different generations of organizations. The first generation emerged at the end of the 19th century and was active until the 1920s. During this first phase, it was mainly women's formal rights that were at the center of the women's movement. Women fought among other things for the right to ownership, inheritance and education. The central issue was however the right to vote and the right to citizenship (which in Sweden was achieved in 1919) and hence the opportunity to influence the shaping of a democratic society (Rönblom 2002).

Most of the organizations that are included in our sample are however part of the so-called second generation of the women's movement which began in the 1960s. A new wave of women's mobilization sprung from the New Left movement and the debate about gender roles. At this time, most of the formal rights of women had already been achieved. The demands now made by women were that women's experience and knowledge would be highlighted and considered in society. The focus of the women's movement had changed from formal rights to demands for a society where women and men in practice had equal opportunities to access and influence. They demanded free abortion, free childcare and campaigned against women's low pay and sexual exploitation (Rönblom 2002; Schmitz 2007). The outreach campaigns and demonstrations of the 1970s were however replaced during the 1980s by increasingly differentiated and specialized activities. Women's refuges

and shelters started to appear in many municipalities in Sweden, which put the issue of men's violence against women on the political agenda (Rönblom 2002; Hedlund 2009).

Previous research has highlighted the political alliance between the state and the women's movement in the Scandinavian countries in the 1980s. The alliance was built upon issues about women's citizenship, employment in the public sector and the expansion of many crucial social welfare services. "State feminism" thus came to be presented as the outcome of the state's response to women's mobilization (Hedlund & Lindberg 2012). Recent development in the "Violence against women policy" shows that a close cooperation at national, regional and local level has been developed through the years with the women's shelters and their umbrella organizations. Such cooperation has included both policy-making and financing of the women's shelters. Such close relation has however implied increased control by public authorities in the name of quality-control and professionalization of the activities financed by the public sector and a downplay of the more ideological elements in the activities (Hedlund 2009).

In the year 2000, 65,000 people were members of a women's organization which equals 1.9 percent of the adult female population (age 16–84) (Vogel et al. 2001). There are two major umbrella organizations for women's and girls' shelters in Sweden which are both members of The Swedish Women's Lobby which in its turn represents Swedish women's organization in the EU-based network European Women's Lobby (EWL). The EWL is the largest umbrella organization of women's organizations in EU. It was set up in 1990 for representing women at the EU level and facilitating communication with the European Commission on women's issues and its main role is to influence EU law and policy. Main focus has been gender mainstreaming in proposed directives and anti-discrimination measures (Bygnes 2013).

Table 3 summarizes some of the most salient differences between the four popular movements and types of CSO, connected to the earlier theoretical discussions about political opportunities and CSOs' resources:

Table 3. The four movements/types of organizations

	Trade unions	Temperance org.	Disability org.	Women's org.
Historic legacy	1 st generation	1 st generation	2 nd generation	2 nd generation
Membership in 2000 (Vogel et al. 2001)	2.900.000	80.000	315.000	65.000
Economic resources	Big	Small	Small	Small
Current policy salience	High	Low	High	High
Degree of political/ institutional embeddedness	High	Low	High	Low
Shift of policy issue from national to EU level during later years	Low	Low, but potentially high	High	High

The CSOs included in our sample

As described above, the CSOs within our random sample were categorized in groups corresponding to the four movements described above. To give a picture of the composition of each of these group, we will here shortly give some figures for the types of organizations that the four CSO categories consist of and how many cases they comprise of in the dataset:

- *Trade unions* consist of 105 cases, from more than 20 organizations. Of these, 46 percent belongs to the Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO), 35 percent to the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), and 18 percent to the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO).
- *Temperance organizations* consist of 58 cases, from more than 7 different organizations. Of these, the largest organizations are IOGT-NTO (including its youth organization) (38 percent), the different organizations of *Länkrörelsen* (38 percent), and MHF (including its youth organization) (7 percent).
- *Disability organizations* consist of 168 cases, from more than 30 different organizations. There is no single organization that is represented with more than 8 percent within this category.
- *Women's organizations* consist of 88 cases. The vast majority of these (85 percent) are Women's shelter organizations.

Results

The first part of the analysis is more descriptive but also includes a bivariate analysis that shows similarities and differences between the four types of CSOs when it comes to their activities on different geographical levels, their economic support from political bodies at different levels, the importance they give to different types of activities, their perceived importance of different political levels, and their experiences of different political strategies (in particular advocacy, lobbying and protests) at those levels. In the second part of the analysis, two binary logistic regressions are made, in order to analyze which factors (apart from CSO type) are most important for CSOs to involve in political advocacy, lobbying or protests.

Table 4. The CSOs' activities on different geographical levels

	Trade unions	Disability org.	Women's org.	Temperance org.	Other org.	Total (%)	Total (N of analyzed cases)	Cramer's V
<i>The organizations's degree of activity on the following geographical levels ("often" and "sometimes")</i>								
Local/municipal level	93	92	85	100	93	93	2 505	n.s.
National level	47	43	29	47	36	37	1 963	n.s.
European level	14	16	17	25	14	14	1 740	n.s.
<i>Member of network/federation/umbrella organization at...</i>								
Local level	59	58	71	76	47	49	2 474	,118 ***
National level	80	76	58	76	58	61	2 470	,136 ***
EU/European level	25	8	4	18	8	9	2 391	,132 ***

Comment: Used measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V. * = 5%, ** = 1%, and *** = 0.1% significance. n.s. = not significant. Percentages and Cramer's V is based on weighted data, N is based on the actual number of cases.

As one can see in Table 4, there are no significant differences between the four types of CSOs when it comes to their degree of activity on different administrative levels. In general, it is the local level, followed by the national level, and then the EU level, that most CSOs are active on. But if the activities of the CSOs are more often local than national (and European), their membership in networks, federations and umbrella organizations are instead slightly more common on the national than the local level (and much more common than on the European level). Organizational networks still seem to be predominantly structured around the nation state. Regarding membership in networks, one can also see greater variation between the four different types of CSOs. For instance, data show that women's organizations are less connected to national than local networks, while it is the opposite for the other three types of CSOs. When it comes to membership in networks on the EU/European level, both temperance organizations and trade unions are this to a significantly higher degree than the other two types of CSOs (and than all the other CSOs of the survey).

Table 5. The CSOs' economic support from political bodies and other important incomes

	Trade unions	Disability org.	Women's org.	Temperance org.	Other org.	Total (%)	Total (N of analyzed cases)	Cramer's V
<i>Economic support from the following political bodies are "very" or "quite important" for the organization's budget:</i>								
Municipality	10	77	61	77	43	45	2 229	,256 ***
State	4	26	62	33	22	22	2 048	,153 ***
EU bodies	1	7	1	3	6	6	1 911	n.s.
<i>Other types of incomes being "very" or "quite important" for the organization's budget:</i>								
Membership fees	83	91	70	76	79	80	2 543	,084 **
Incomes from selling goods or services	3	36	40	70	47	47	2 252	,200 ***
<i>Agreement in statement about organization (agree "very" or "quite" much):</i>								
Our organization provides services on behalf of the local municipality, the region or the state.	7	12	13	8	8	8	2 398	n.s.

Comment: Used measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V. * = 5%, ** = 1%, and *** = 0.1% significance. n.s. = not significant. Percentages and Cramer's V is based on weighted data, N is based on the actual number of cases.

When it comes to different types of public support that are important for the CSOs, one can in Table 5 see the same general pattern as for the organizations' primary geographical level of activity: for most CSOs, it is primarily economic support from the local municipality that is crucial for their budgets. However, in most cases, membership fees are still a more important source of money for the CSOs than support from various public bodies. Regarding the variation between the four types of CSOs in their dependence on public support, the data shows that trade unions to a much lower degree are dependent on public funding, at both local and national level. This could be interpreted as a consequence of their much larger membership base, which make them less dependent on public funding. When it comes to public funding from the state, women's organizations are to a much higher degree than other types of CSOs dependent on this. This can probably be seen as a consequence of that women's shelters are primarily funded by national agencies (such as "The National Board of Health and Welfare", *Socialstyrelsen*) and not by local municipalities. Tabel 5 also shows considerable variation between the different types of CSOs when it comes to incomes from selling goods or services. For in particular temperance organizations, but also to a certain degree disability and women's organizations, these types of activities are crucial for the budgets of the CSOs.

Table 6. The CSOs' perceived importance of different types of activities

	Trade unions	Disability org.	Women's org.	Temperance org.	Other org.	Total (%)	Total (N of analyzed cases)	Cramer's V
<i>How important are the following activities for your organization? Percentage for "very" and "quite important".</i>								
Advocacy: Change public opinion (i.e. through the media)	75	82	63	84	41	47	2 407	,272 ***
Lobbying (directly influencing politicians and officials)	63	79	56	62	34	39	2 372	,267 ***
Demonstrations	51	27	41	31	10	14	2 345	,306 ***
Help and support persons with special needs	56	98	71	67	41	46	2 454	,304 ***
Educate and empower the members of one's organization	92	92	87	91	71	74	2 506	,165 ***
Disseminate information and knowledge to the public	72	97	87	90	69	71	2 506	,174 ***

Comment: Used measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V. * = 5%, ** = 1%, and *** = 0.1% significance. n.s. = not significant. Percentages and Cramer's V is based on weighted data, N is based on the actual number of cases.

When it comes to the types of activities that in general are important for the organizations, all four types of CSOs in our study perceive "educating and empowering the members of one's organization" as one of their most important activities (see Table 6). Also "disseminating information and knowledge to the public" is perceived as very important activities by most of the CSOs. Disability organizations, not surprisingly, also see "helping and support persons with special needs" as their most important activity, and this in a much higher degree than the other three types of CSOs. In comparison to the abovementioned three types of activities, the activities concerning political influence are in general seen as less important.

Regarding how the CSOs in general perceive of political influence, it is foremost advocacy and lobbying that are seen as important activities, while quite a low degree of the CSOs see demonstrations as an important activity. One can however find much variation between the four types of CSOs, in how important they see different strategies for influencing politics. For instance, disability organizations see lobbying as more important than the other types of CSOs do, while trade unions see demonstrations as a more important activity than the other CSOs do. We will later come back to these questions in the regression analysis, to see if these differences are primarily dependent on the four CSO types as such, or if we can find other underlying reasons for this variation in how different strategies are valued.

Table 7. The CSOs' perceived importance of different political levels and their experiences of influencing politicians or officials at those levels.

	Trade unions	Disability org.	Women's org.	Temperance org.	Other org.	Total (%)	Total (N of analyzed cases)	Cramer's V
<i>Perceived importance of different political levels, for solving the problems/issues focused by the organization ("very" and "quite important")</i>								
Local/municipal level	77	84	74	93	64	67	2 441	,144 ***
National level	75	70	69	68	43	47	2 280	,203 ***
European level	28	29	39	40	15	17	2 038	,158 ***
<i>"Often" or "sometimes" tries to influence politicians or officials to obtain the goals of the organization, on the following political levels:</i>								
Local/municipal level	66	81	72	72	46	50	2 541	,207 ***
National level	50	37	50	29	19	23	2 388	,197 ***
European level	13	4	19	6	5	5	2 279	,104 ***
<i>Influencing politician or officials have "often" or "sometimes" led to changes, on the following political levels:</i>								
Local/municipal level	54	43	34	44	41	42	2 057	n.s.
National level	37	15	13	21	14	15	1 821	,156 ***
European level	6	4	2	5	3	3	1 667	n.s.

Comment: Used measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V. * = 5%, ** = 1%, and *** = 0.1% significance. n.s. = not significant. Percentages and Cramer's V is based on weighted data, N is based on the actual number of cases.

In Table 7, one can see in which degree the CSOs perceive of different political levels as important for solving the problems or issues that the organizations are addressing. While trade unions perceive the local and the national level almost as equally important, the other three types of CSOs – in particular the disability and the temperance organizations – perceive the local level as more important than the national. This might be connected to the fact that the latter two CSO types are more “user’s organizations”, often focusing on welfare issues and services that are organized and provided at the local level. But it is also in line with the more general pattern that the CSOs’ activities is foremost local, and that they foremost receive public economic support from the local municipalities. All four types of CSOs perceive the European level as less important than both the local and the national level. Amongst the four types of CSOs, there is however some variation in how important the European level is perceived. Here, the women’s and temperance organizations stand out as valuing the European level as more important than the other two types of CSOs do.

Looking at the political level at which the organizations have actually tried to influence politicians and officials, we see the same pattern. Influencing politics is still mostly a local affair. This is in particular the case for the disability organizations, which also together with the temperance organizations have far more experience in influencing politicians and officials at the local level compared to the national

level. Amongst those having greatest experience in influencing these actors on the national level, we in particular find the trade unions and women's organizations. These two types of CSOs also have the highest experience in influencing politics on the European level. Trade unions also perceive such attempts to influence politicians and officials as more effective than the other three types of CSOs do, at least on the national level. When it comes to these influencing activities we also find that all four types of CSOs are more active than the general population of CSOs of our study, which most probably depend on the fact that they are organizations working for the interests of specific groups. However, it might be important to notice that the four CSOs' degree of perceived effectiveness of their influencing activities is not much higher than the average.

Table 8. The CSOs' experiences of different types of political advocacy, lobbying and protests.

	Trade unions	Disability org.	Women's org.	Temperance org.	Other org.	Total (%)	Total (N of analyzed cases)	Cramer's V
<i>How often have your organization used the following means to influence Swedish politics? Percentage for "often" and "sometimes".</i>								
Mass media	54	41	44	53	26	29	2 361	,175 ***
Social media	41	20	37	28	19	20	2 289	,132 ***
Influencing national politicians	38	25	31	29	18	19	2 291	,125 ***
Influencing state officials	21	23	27	20	14	16	2 273	,071 *
Participated in government commissions	26	28	22	14	12	14	2 253	,134 ***
Influencing local politicians	53	63	46	52	37	40	2 383	,146 ***
Influencing local officials	41	70	47	53	39	41	2 370	,157 ***
Demonstrations	34	8	25	21	7	9	2 289	,226 ***
Petitions	37	11	6	31	13	15	2 295	,167 ***
<i>How often have your organization used the following means to influence EU politics? Percentage for "often" and "sometimes".</i>								
Use European networks	13	4	20	8	3	4	2 265	,137 ***
Influencing Swedish politicians or officials	31	16	32	24	13	15	2 303	,132 ***
Influencing EU politicians	12	1	23	16	5	6	2 273	,129 ***
Influencing EU officials	6	1	1	0	2	2	2 250	,073 *
Demonstrations	18	2	8	2	4	5	2 287	,146 ***

Comment: Used measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V. * = 5%, ** = 1%, and *** = 0.1% significance. n.s. = not significant. Percentages and Cramer's V is based on weighted data, N is based on the actual number of cases.

In Table 8, we find more precise measures for the ways in which the CSOs try to influence politics, for both Swedish and EU politics. The strategies adopted to influence Swedish politics seem to follow the

same pattern as in the earlier tables. For instance, “demonstrations” are mostly used by trade unions while disability organizations mostly use “influencing local officials” and “local politicians”. When it comes to influencing EU politics, trade unions, women’s and temperance organizations have been most active. It might be important to notice that “influencing Swedish politicians or officials” is the most common strategy to influence EU politics rather than directly influencing EU politicians and officials, or even using the European CSO networks to which the organizations belong.

In regression 1 and 2, we do an analysis of which factors that might be underlying the different CSOs’ choice of different strategies for influencing politics. The method used is binary logistic regression. This analysis not only allows us to see the relative impact of different factors – including being part of one of our four studied CSO types – on the organizations’ probability to see political advocacy, lobbying and demonstrations as important activities. It also allows us to control for whether certain variables can be seen as underlying the results presented in the bivariate analysis of table 6.

In regression 1, we control for the variables on the CSOs’ amount of members and employed staff, and whether they reside in a big city (i.e. with more than 200,000 inhabitants, which in Sweden equals the three largest cities). As can be seen in the regression, the size of membership seems to play a crucial role for the probability that an organization adopts one of the three strategies. For political advocacy and lobbying, the probability to see these activities as important also increases considerable when the organizations are meta-organizations (i.e. organizations that only has other organizations as members, which could be umbrella organizations, federations, etc.). In line with this, we can also see that organizations having employed staff are more probable to be involved in advocacy and lobbying (and to a certain extent in demonstrations). Furthermore, organizations residing in big cities are more probable to see lobbying as an important activity. This indicates that meta-organizations are more probable to involve in advocacy and lobbying than demonstrations, which is an activity where many members instead seems to play a more decisive role. One possible explanation can be that handling the media and contacting politicians and officials is easier for meta-organizations with employed staff (and in the case of lobbying, the proximity to central politicians and officials in the large cities), since these do both have a central role in networks of organizations and have more resources in terms of paid workforce. For demonstrations, it is instead more crucial to have the possibility to mobilize many members, in order to make this way of influencing politics more efficient.

When controlling for these variables in regressions 1, we can also see that some of the correlations shown in table 6 are changed. This is particular the case for women’s organizations, which now stand out as more probable to see advocacy activities as important than the other three types of CSOs, and as the type of CSO that is most prone to see lobbying as an important activity.

Regression 1: CSO type and control variables

Variable	Model 1A <i>Advocacy / Change public opinion</i>			Model 1B <i>Lobbying</i>			Model 1C <i>Demonstrations</i>		
	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)
<i>CSO type (Trade union = ref.)</i>									
Disability org.	0,555	0,374	1,742	0,542 †	0,310	1,719	-0,760 *	0,297	0,468
Women's org.	0,877 †	0,455	2,403	0,894 *	0,391	2,445	0,313	0,342	1,367
Temperance org.	-0,355	0,447	0,701	-0,357	0,404	0,700	-0,717	0,446	0,488
Other org.	-1,455 ***	0,278	0,233	-1,289 ***	0,234	0,275	-2,066 ***	0,233	0,127
<i>Control variables</i>									
No. of members (1–99 = ref.)									
100–999 members	0,482 ***	0,108	1,619	0,340 **	0,111	1,404	0,428 *	0,177	1,555
> 1000 members	0,883 ***	0,169	2,418	0,350 *	0,168	1,420	0,785 **	0,251	2,192
Meta-organization	0,833 ***	0,202	2,301	1,064 ***	0,201	2,899	0,185	0,328	1,204
Employed staff (0 = ref.)									
< 5	0,442 ***	0,113	1,556	0,468 ***	0,113	1,597	0,403 *	0,162	1,496
5 or more	0,488 **	0,167	1,628	0,119	0,166	1,126	-0,150	0,253	0,861
Org. in big city (> 200 000 inh.)	-0,024	0,128	0,977	0,382 **	0,126	1,465	-0,028	0,187	0,972
Constant	0,827 **	0,284	2,286	0,259	0,244	1,296	-0,777 **	0,260	0,460
Observations	2184			2152			2130		
Nagelkerke's pseudo R ²	0,161			0,152			0,157		

† p<10%, * p<5%, ** p<1%, and *** p<.1%

Regression 2: CSO type, control variables, network membership, public economic support and issue saliency

Variable	Model 2A			Model 2B			Model 2C		
	<i>Advocacy / Change public opinion</i>			<i>Lobbying</i>			<i>Demonstrations</i>		
	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)
<i>CSO type (Trade union = ref.)</i>									
Disability org.	0,476	0,479	1,609	0,220	0,414	1,246	-1,428 ***	0,429	0,240
Women's org.	0,392	0,603	1,479	0,404	0,563	1,498	-0,482	0,512	0,617
Temperance org.	-0,124	0,683	0,883	-0,844	0,604	0,430	-1,890 **	0,727	0,151
Other org.	-1,093 **	0,347	0,335	-1,122 ***	0,308	0,326	-2,476 ***	0,338	0,084
<i>Control variables</i>									
No. of members (1-99 = ref.)									
100-999 members	0,379 *	0,153	1,461	0,383 *	0,158	1,466	0,556 *	0,263	1,743
> 1000 members	0,876 ***	0,239	2,400	0,512 *	0,234	1,669	1,113 **	0,353	3,044
Meta-organization	0,731 *	0,282	2,076	0,793 **	0,275	2,211	0,381	0,443	1,464
Employed staff (0 = ref.)									
< 5	0,003	0,173	1,003	-0,166	0,173	0,847	0,064	0,244	1,066
5 or more	-0,046	0,237	0,955	-0,350	0,232	0,704	-0,677 †	0,357	0,508
Org. in big city (> 200 000 inh.)	-0,432 *	0,188	0,649	0,235	0,180	1,264	-0,181	0,262	0,834
<i>Member of network/federation/umbrella organization at...</i>									
Local level	0,307 *	0,138	1,360	0,023	0,142	1,024	0,377 †	0,222	1,458
National level	0,315 *	0,151	1,370	0,029	0,158	1,030	0,775 **	0,286	2,171
EU/European level	0,487 *	0,223	1,628	0,037	0,204	1,038	-0,032	0,273	0,969
<i>Public economic support from...</i>									
Municipality	0,121	0,154	1,128	0,592 ***	0,152	1,807	0,518 *	0,238	1,678
State	0,326 †	0,169	1,386	0,401 *	0,163	1,494	0,312	0,243	1,366
EU bodies	0,306	0,309	1,558	0,431	0,294	1,539	0,479	0,370	1,615
<i>Perceived importance of political level</i>									
Local/municipal level	0,394 *	0,156	1,483	0,532 **	0,165	1,703	0,207	0,294	1,230
National level	1,024 ***	0,148	2,784	0,939 ***	0,155	2,557	0,403	0,284	1,496
European level	1,032 ***	0,206	2,808	1,122 ***	0,184	3,071	1,306 ***	0,235	3,691
Constant	-0,790 *	0,380	0,454	-1,199 ***	0,352	0,301	-2,466 ***	0,476	0,085
Observations	1356			1351			1350		
Nagelkerke's pseudo R ²	0,352			0,330			0,314		

In regression 2, some further variables are introduced, regarding membership in network, economic support from public bodies and perceived importance of different political levels. As can be seen in the regression, the perceived importance of different political levels (for solving the problems or issues that the organization focus on) now plays the most important role (together with the CSOs' membership size) for organizations to see the three strategies for political influence as important. For political advocacy and demonstrations, membership in networks at various geographical levels do also play an important role, while in this regression having employed staff do not any longer have any particular influence on the probability to see these activities as central for the organization. For lobbying and demonstrations, public economic support from in particular local municipalities also seems to play a certain role.

When controlling for these variables in regression 2, it shows that it does not any longer play a decisive role whether an organization belongs to one of the four CSO sectors for it to value political advocacy and lobbying as important activities. However, when it comes to demonstrations, CSO type still has an explanatory value, making it more probable for trade unions and women's organizations to see demonstrations as important activities, compared to disability and temperance organizations. This probably indicates that factors specifically connected to CSO type, such as the "social movement culture" the CSO is part of, still plays an important role for the organizations' priorities when it comes to demonstrations.

Conclusions

In this paper, we have scrutinized which strategies organizations four Swedish CSO sectors make use of to influence politics and society. The four CSO sectors – trade unions, disability, women's and temperance organizations – all represent specific organized groups and interests, that are in particular trying to influence social policies. Focusing both the "political opportunities" provided by the political context, and the various resources the CSOs potentially can mobilized, the aim of the paper have been both to show in which degree one can see differences between the four CSO sectors' use of different strategies on different geographical levels to accomplish social and political change, and to seek explanations for possible variation.

If many previous studies of CSOs' use of strategies to influence politics have focused on lobbying, we have in this paper also highlighted the use of more conflict-oriented means of influencing politics by analyzing whether street protests are seen as important or regularly used by the CSOs. Even though both political advocacy and lobbying is more common, one can still see that demonstrations belong to the repertoire of how central Swedish CSOs tries to influence politics. Many times street protests are

seen as the foremost political “weapon of the weak” (e.g. Schlozman, Verba & Brady 2012: 124), which express a quite classical notion of how subordinate groups denied access to conventional political arenas can potentially achieve social change through protest activities. In our analysis, this notion does however not get any support. Even though the Swedish trade unions are both highly connected to conventional political arenas and do possess large economic resources, they stand out as the type of CSO that use demonstrations more than other. Apparently, there is no direct trade-off between strategies to influence politics through the institutions – which has always been seen as a central feature of Swedish corporatism – and more conflict-oriented political strategies. More probably, this can be interpreted that firm access to institutional politics also allows for a CSO to take part in protest activities without the risk of losing its role as a political actor having good access to established politicians and officials. Furthermore, in the case of the Swedish trade unions, their very large membership base also must play a role for their use of demonstrations (which was a factor shown to be important in our analysis) as well as the “social movement culture” they belong to by being part of the workers’ movement.

In this paper, we have also focused the role that different geographical and administrative levels play for the CSOs’ use of different strategies to influence politics. Much of the previous literature has focused on differences between the national and EU level, but in our analysis we did also include the local level. Our analysis shows that when taking also the sub-national levels into account, one can clearly see that most CSOs are primarily rooted in the local context. This regards the geographical level at which they have most activities, the public bodies that they receive economic support from, the administrative level they perceive as most important to influence in order to achieve their political goals, and regarding where the CSOs have most experiences of influencing politicians and officials. To only talk about an Europeanization of the actors of civil society – implying a one-sided shift in the area of politics, advocacy, lobby and protest from the nation-state to the supranational structures of EU – without taking the predominance of local political activities amongst CSOs into account may thus risk an important part of how CSOs work. Even though our data cannot say anything about whether the CSOs’ activities and targets for achieving political influence have changed geographical level over time, they surely show that the vast majority of these efforts today are going on locally.

However, one can still see that some types of CSOs in a higher degree than others engage in efforts to influence EU politics, even though this is done in a lesser degree than influencing local or national politics. Amongst the four types of CSOs of our study it is in particular the trade unions and women’s organizations that do this. The disability organizations stand out as the type of CSO that mostly work locally to influence politics.

It is also interesting to note that even though the CSOs' resources – in particular their membership size – are central for whether they see various forms of activities aiming at influencing politics as important, the relative importance they ascribe to a specific administrative level for solving the problems or issues they address is at the same time crucial for this evaluation of strategies. Access to resources may thus be important, but this is not enough (and sometimes not even necessary) – the CSOs' identification of a specific level of politics as a relevant political level for achieving change may be even more important. This shows that obstacles in terms of lack of resources are not the only explanation for why some CSOs do not try to influence politics on different levels; many times, it may obviously be the case that they do not perceive a specific political level as an arena where change can be achieved. And in order for a CSO to try to influence politics, it must first see politics as a structure that may contribute to the achievement of its goals. If they do, it is then a matter about which types of resources they have, and which strategies and levels of politics they believe will give them the best opportunities for accomplishing the social and political change they strive for.

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